



Successful community forest management without formal ownership rights in the Peruvian Amazon



Good enough tenure and long-term investments

Tenure security: Degree to which an individual or group believes its relationship to land and other resources is safe rather than in jeopardy (Poffenberger, 1990)

Dominant view: Lack of government issued land and resource property a constraint for small-scale farmers and forest communities, as considered requirement for long-term investments

Rural forest areas in tropical countries as a mix of formal, informal, traditional etc. rights over lands and resources. Still many activities, investments.

Can 'good enough' informal, semi-formal, traditional arrangements be a basis for long-term investments of small-scale farmers and forest communities, and their donors and financiers?

Objective

Assess how different combinations of three conditions can help explain success or failure of community forest management

1. Formal forest ownership
2. Community enforcement
3. Community access to government sanctioning

All influence TENURE SECURITY

Data and methods

Search for voluntary community forest management & conservation initiatives outside of context of big REDD+ and other donor financed projects

12 Case Studies

- Indigenous, riverside, and migrant communities in the *Loreto, San Martin, Amazonas regions*
- In forest frontier and remote areas
- Main motivation ecosystem services



Variety of formal, informal and customary property arrangements

Private Conservation Areas in titled communities

Conservation Concessions over informal community forests

Titled communities in Municipal Environment Conservation Areas (ACAM)

Informal communities in ACAM


Informal indigenous or peasant patrol conservation areas in untitled communities

Internal conservation agreement and contract with NGO over an informal community forest

Formal tenure rights,
recognized by national/
regional governments


**More or less formal
tenure rights,** only
recognized at local level

**Informal and customary
tenure rights**



Measuring success of community forestry --- average anual tree cover loss before/after initiative

Deforestation in the Native Community of Chapís



1. Formal ownership

	Fully successful	Partially successful	Partially unsuccessful	Fully unsuccessful
Formal		PAMP		INDU CHAP
Quite formal	OJOS	RON ANGE		BIAV
Quite informal			DIAZ	
Informal	AREN JUNG	AMAY HOCI		

MEASURES

Formal access rights

Formal subsistence & commercial withdrawal rights

Formal management rights

Formal exclusion rights

2. Community enforcement

	Fully successful	Partially successful	Partially un-successful	Fully un-successful
Robust community enforcement	OJOS AREN	ANGE RONS HO CI		
Quite robust community enforcement	JUNG	AMAY PAMP		
Quite weak community enforcement				BIAV
Weak community enforcement			DIAZ	INDU CHAP

MEASURES

Paths, signs, constructions, and buffer zones

Community monitoring

Community sanctioning of internal/external rule breakers

3. Community access to government sanctioning

	Fully successful	Partially successful	Partially un-successful	Fully un-successful
Responsible government authorities		AMAY		
Quite responsive government authorities	JUNG OJOS AREN			INDU BIAV
Quite irresponsible government authorities		RON PAMP	DIAZ	
Irresponsible government authorities		ANGE HOCI		CHAP

MEASURE

Government sanctioning of rule breakers upon request of community leaders

Research & data analysis:

Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

- **Robust community enforcement** is a **NECESSARY** condition for successful community forest management (*sufficiency: 0.901*)
- Two **SUFFICIENT** combinations of conditions for **successful** community forest management (*solution consistency: 0.877; solution coverage: 0.702*)

Robust
community
enforcement

+

Formal forest ownership

unique coverage: 0.202

OR

+

Good community access to
government sanctioning

unique coverage: 0.301

Successful community
forest management

*solution consistency: 0.877;
solution coverage: 0.702*



Can 'good enough tenure' schemes realistically play a role in solving the economic, social and environmental problems in r

- **Yes:** informal ownership rights and enforcement systems widely respected locally and used for many investments of farmers/forest dwellers in practice
- Need for clear informal property rights and strong existing community enforcement mechanisms
- Shift needed from tenure regularization to building on existing local enforcement mechanisms



Limitations and their mitigation

Risk that others get the land titled (i.e. multinationals, palm oil, land mafia)

Mitigate: moratorium, delineation informal rights with Fit-or-Purpose approach

Potential weakness of community enforcement systems with increasing threats and economic opportunities

Mitigate: technical assistance/working with communities

Unadapted government systems

Mitigate: big changes needed



Thank you!

